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Divided societies in the developing world experience wasteful struggles for power. We
study the relationship between political stability and resources wasted in the struggle
within a model of competitive power contests. The model of power contests is similar in
structure to models describing oligopolistic market competition. This analogy helps us
in deriving results that are new to the con￿ict literature. We show, for example, that
the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman index can be interpreted as a measure of power concentration
and that a peace treaty between ￿ghting groups have a parallel in tacit collusion between
￿rms in a market.
JEL code: C70, D23, D74
Key words: Violent con￿icts, Rent-seeking games, Her￿ndahl-Hirschman index,
Oligopolistic competition.1
... the eﬀorts of men are utilized in two diﬀerent ways: they are directed to the
production or transformation of economic goods, or else to the appropriation
of goods produced by others. War, especially in ancient times, has enabled a
strong nation to appropriate the goods of a weak one; within a given nation,
it is by means of laws and, from time to time, revolution, that the strong still
despoils the weak. [...] It is obvious that the maximum economic advantage
for society is not obtained in this way.
Vilfredo Pareto: Manuale di economia politica, 1906 (transl. 1972 p. 341)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
How does the violent contest between MPLA (Movimento Popular de Liberta‚ c￿ ao de An-
gola) and UNITA (Uni￿ ao Nacional de Indep￿ endencia Total de Angola) in Angola diﬀer
from the market contest between McDonalds and Burger King? In theory at least, one
may wonder whether a civil war, in which groups ￿ght over rents, is strategically any
diﬀerent from oligopolistic market competition between producers. In both arenas the
contenders incur costs in order to capture the highest expected payoﬀs. They engage in
a strategic game where higher eﬀort by one lowers the return to the other.
By addressing this question we may better understand the logic of con￿icts and hope-
fully also the determinants of the violence that plagues poor countries today. There is
a tradition in the con￿ict literature1 of modelling violent con￿icts as strategic contests
that formally have similarities to models of oligopolistic competition. Even though the
strategic interaction in markets and in battle￿elds are similar to each other, the major
normative conclusions are diametrically diﬀerent. In markets contenders compete by sup-
plying commodities, which enhance social welfare. In the battle￿eld contenders compete
by supplying violence which harms social welfare. Hence, while a tough market compe-
tition implies low social waste, a tough competition in the battle￿eld implies high social
waste.
More speci￿cally, in the marketplace welfare is best served by many contenders that
are equally eﬃcient and never collude. In the battle￿eld such a competitive structure
spells serious trouble. For a given number of contenders the social waste is highest when
all contenders are equal. Thus, what we want to prevent in the marketplace is exactly
what we want to see in the battle￿eld. This is especially true for the phenomenon of
collusion, which prevents eﬃcient competition in markets. In the battle￿eld collusion
among all the contenders implies peaceful sharing of the rents without wasted lives and
resources.
In this paper we explore some analogies and contrasts between games of market com-
petition and games of power struggles. Well-known results from the con￿ict literature
appear in a new perspective. In particular, we ￿nd that the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman index
of market concentration has a parallel in the con￿ict model as a measure of dominance
of one group over the others. This measure is both directly related to the amount of re-
sources wasted in the ￿ght and to the turnover of winners in the contest. Moreover, entry
and exit, which play an essential role in theories of market behavior, have unexplored
implications for the theory of power struggles.
1See for example the contributions by Tullock (1980), Hirshleifer (1991 and 1995b), Skaperdas (1992)
Grossman (1994), Grossman and Kim (1995), Konrad and Skaperdas (1998), Clark and Riis (1998),
Mehlum and Moene (2000), and Tangerß as and Lagerl¤ of (2002).2
We are interested in several questions in this connection. Does a more fractionalized
society imply that a larger or a smaller number of the groups participate in the ￿ghtings?
D o e sal a r g e rn u m b e ro fw a r - e ﬃcient groups drive the least war-eﬃcient groups from the
battle￿eld? Incorporating endogenous participation, or simply entry and exit of ￿ghting
groups, casts doubt on the generality of some of the established results in the con￿ict
literature. Finally, the implications of group heterogeneity may also change once collusion
possibilities are allowed. Equity among groups, which tends to maximize the extent of
￿ghting once it is started, reduces the chance that the ￿ghting starts in the ￿rst place.
T h et y p eo fc o n ￿ict model that we consider was ￿rst discussed in a little recognized
contribution by Haavelmo (1954), who in turn was inspired by the remark made by Pareto,
c i t e da b o v e . W eu s eas i m p l ev e r s i o no ft h em o d e lw h e r ec o n t e n d e r s￿g h to v e ra￿xed
rent. The contest success function (or allotment function as Haavelmo called it) is of
ratio form where the probability that group k wins is equal to this group￿s ￿ghting eﬀort
relative to that of the other groups. Using this speci￿cation we get a closed-form solution
where the parallel to an oligopolistic market with unit demand elasticity is immediate.
2T h e b a s i c m o d e l
There is a given number of groups N that in each period compete for power. The winner
receives a rent R. The rent includes for example the value of natural resources under
government control and the in￿ow of aid and loans from abroad. Each period starts
with all groups deciding on their ￿ghting eﬀort yk. When ￿ghts are violent, yk includes
armaments, mercenaries, and ￿eld rations. (When ￿ghts are non-violent, yk may capture
resources used for vote buying, election rigging, and favoritism). The problem for each
group k =1...N is to maximize each periods expected pay-oﬀ, vk,g i v e nb y







In (1), the probability of winning the rent, ρk is given as group k￿s ￿ghting eﬀort, yk,
relative to the total ￿ghting eﬀort of all groups, Q.T h e v a l u e o f Q includes the total
resources (armaments and soldiers) brought to the battle￿eld. Thus, Q measures the
extent of the ￿ght. If ￿ghts are non-violent, Q then measures the total ￿ow of payments
and favors within political networks and cliental structures.
In (1) αk captures group k￿s opportunity costs of providing one unit of ￿ghting to the
battle. Generally, αk measures group k ￿s eﬃciency in production relative to ￿ghting.
One unit of ￿ghting costs αk units of foregone production. Hence, the opportunity cost
αk is low when group k either is an eﬃcient ￿ghter or has a low alternative productivity.
These ￿ghting costs may depend on the size of the groups. For instance, if smaller groups
a r em o r ec o s te ﬃcient in ￿ghting, they would have a low α coeﬃcient.
In the following we assume that the α coeﬃcients are constant and we refer to them as
the ￿ghting costs with the interpretation just given. Moreover, we also assume, for now,
that all groups are suﬃciently eﬃcient to chose to participate in the ￿ght. In the Nash





Q2 R − αk =0 . (2)3
Hence, we assume an interior solution to the problem. Realistically, there are some
resource constraints on each group￿s ￿ghting yk.W er e t u r nb r i e ￿yt oc o n s e q u e n c e so fa
binding resource constraint for instance for the smaller and deprived groups (see footnotes
5 and 6), but in most of the presentation we assume that the resource constraints are not






































Thus, the extent of the ￿ght Q,t h ee ﬀort yk of group k and the expected pay-oﬀ vk of
group k are proportional to the contested rent R.G r o u p k￿s ￿ghting eﬀort yk and its
chance of winning the prize ρk are higher, the lower the cost αk relative to the average ﬂ α.3
The value of P measures the average gross return to ￿ghting, since from (5) P = R/Q.
This de￿nition of P establishes the bridge between con￿icts and markets as discussed
below.
Fighting is detrimental to social welfare because it diverts resources from production
and causes suﬀering. Concentrating on the opportunity costs, we oﬀer a conservative
2Note that (1) can be written vk =( 1− αkQ/R)ρkR.
3We have explicitly assumed that all yk are positive in equilibrium. As we discuss below, (8) represents
a participation constraint, such that group i withdraws from the ￿ght if αi >P .The analytical solution
(8) would otherwise yield a negative ￿ghting eﬀort, which of course is nonsense.4





Surely the sum of opportunity costs, W, underestimates the total social waste, because
we do not account for the destruction of resources and the loss of lives among the civilian
population. In addition, complementarity in production implies that a shift of resources
away from productive activities lowers the income also of non-￿ghting groups. Stark
examples of the cost imposed on the third party are the war-related famines in Biafra
(1967), Ethiopia (periodically from 1970￿s to the present), and Somalia (1991-95). All
these costs are positively related to W and in the following we stick to the conservative
measure of resources wasted. The fraction of the rent that is wasted in the contest ￿ the
waste ratio ω ￿ is given by the waste relative to the size of R. Based on (5)-(9), it follows













where γ2 is the coeﬃcient of variation (γ2 =v a r( αi)/α2).
The discussion above can be summarized in the following proposition (part of which
i sd i s c u s s e di nN i t z a n1 9 9 4 ) :
Proposition 1 i) The extent of the ￿ght, Q, is greater when either the prize is larger or
the ￿ghting costs ﬂ α are lower. The extent of ￿ghting is, however, independent of γ,w h i c h
measures the heterogeneity of the groups￿ ￿ghting costs. The ￿ght is harder, the higher
the number of groups N involved in the battle. ii) The social waste W is greater when a
larger prize is at stake, but is independent of the ￿ghting costs ﬂ α and declines with the
heterogeneity of the groups￿ ￿ghting costs. If the heterogeneity γ is low, social waste goes
up with the number of groups. If γ > (N2 − 1)
−1/2 , however, the social waste goes down
as the number of ￿ghting groups rises.
Proof. Part i) follows from (5) where a low ﬂ α captures a low opportunity cost of
￿ghting. Part ii) follows directly from (10)
The ￿ghting becomes more intense when the average opportunity cost of ￿ghting ﬂ α
declines. Even a small prize may therefore produce intensive ￿ghts if the ￿ghting groups
have little to lose. Striking examples of low ﬂ α are the mobilization of unemployed kids in
rebellion armies and civil wars throughout Africa.￿They need less food than adult soldiers,
take up less space and can do without a wage￿ (The Economist 1999). According to Save
the Children(1998) there are 31,000 children soldiers in Sudan, 20,000 in Rwanda and
5-10,000 in Uganda, Congo, Sierra Leone, Angola, and Burundi. In the model, adding a
g r o u pw i t ht h ea v e r a g ec o s tﬂ α increases the extent of the ￿ght but at a declining rate.
T h em o r ei n t e n s et h e￿ghting, the lower is the incentive to ￿ght for an additional group.4
4As pointed out, we assume that all groups are free to adjust their ￿ghting at ￿xed opportunity cost
αk. If one group￿s ￿ghting were limited by a resource constraint (yk ≤ ﬂ yk), say because of its small size,
the solution to the model would change. It is straight forward to show that if one group is constrained to
a level of ￿ghting below its optimal level, the other groups would ￿ght somewhat harder. Total ￿ghting
would anyhow be below the unconstrained case.5
G r e a t e rc o s td i ﬀerences across groups implies that less resources are wasted in the
struggle for power. When one group obtains lower costs of ￿ghting, it becomes relatively
stronger than its challengers. Faced with a more potent opposition, other groups reduce
their spending on unproductive ￿ghting. When high-cost groups spend less, it is optimal
also for low cost groups to reduce their spending; hence, total waste declines with group
heterogeneity. Paradoxically, eﬃciency requires one dominant group. Waste declines, the
stronger is one group relative to the others. ￿Fair ￿ghts,￿ where each group is equally
strong, produces the maximum level of social waste. It should be noted, however, that
the concept of social waste that we use has a rather narrow interpretation in which no
weight is put on distributional aspects. A society with a powerful dictator who is able to
collect all the rent into his pocket without any ￿ghting, has a low level of waste in this
conception.
From (7) it follows that for the average group (the group with α =ﬂ α) the probability
of winning is 1/N which yields an expected net return of only R/N2. When all groups are
equal, each of them only gets a share 1/N 2. The social waste ratio in this case is simply
(N − 1)/N which is increasing in the number of groups but at a decreasing rate. When
N is large the waste ratio approaches one.
Fractionalized societies have many groups. Fights in fractionalized societies are there-
fore particularly intense. Whether fractionalization implies a high social waste or not,
however, depends on how diﬀerent the groups are with respect to productive opportuni-
ties, as captured by the value of γ. Note that for a positive γ the expression (10) is a
h u m p - s h a p e df u n c t i o no fN.
3 Parallels to oligopoly theory
In his overview of economic theories of con￿ict, Hirshleifer (1995a) points out several
analogies between markets and con￿icts but without exploring them further. In this
section we want to take a closer look at these analogies. The results in Proposition 1
are derived from a model that is similar to the Cournot model of oligopoly. To see this,
consider a market with unit demand elasticity, Q = R/P, where Q is the total demand, P
the price and R the value of total sales in the market. A number of ￿rms N supply identical
goods yk with constant marginal cost αk. Hence, supply is Q =
P
yk and yk/Q denotes
￿rm k￿s market share. Applied to such an oligopoly model equation (1) describes ￿rm k￿s
pro￿t and the Nash equilibrium is described by equations (4)-(6). All the results we have
derived can therefore be translated directly to the oligopoly market case. Conversely,
several results from the theory of oligopolistic markets can be translated to the case of
violent con￿icts.
In the oligopolistic market, the equilibrium price is determined by (6), the marketed
quantity by (5), and each ￿rm￿s return by (4). In the oligopoly model, ρk, given by (7),









In spite of analytical similarities, the welfare implications of oligopolistic competition
are diametrically diﬀerent than con￿ict on the battle￿eld. In an oligopolistic market,
Q =
P
yk is a private good brought to the market, while, in the case of war, Q is a public
bad brought to the battleground. This important distinction shows up as we now turn to6
a comparison of power dominance to market dominance.
Dominance and the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman Index.
From Cowling and Waterson (1976), we know that in oligopolistic markets the ratio of
pro￿ts to revenue
P
vk/R is directly related to the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman index of market
concentration. Such a connection between dominance and payoﬀ also exists in the con￿ict









In markets ￿ measures the concentration of ￿rms￿ market shares. Here, ￿ measures the











which shows that the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman index of ￿ghting eﬀort equals the ratio of
total net returns to total rents. The second equality of (12) demonstrates that ￿ is also a
measure of concentration of the winning probabilities of the warring groups. In fact, ￿ is
the probability that the same group is the winner in a hypothetical case of two subsequent
battles. A high ￿ is therefore equivalent to a situation with a high stability of winners,
or simply power dominance. In Mehlum and Moene (2000), we undertake an explicit
analysis of stability in a dynamic model of violent con￿ict, where we also include the
feature that the incumbent has an edge.
The measure of power dominance ￿ is directly related to the waste ratio ω.A sω is
the fraction of the rents that is wasted in the contest, while ￿ is the fraction not wasted,
it is immediate that
ω =1− ￿. (13)
Combining these observations, we get the following proposition
Proposition 2 The power dominance is high when the heterogeneity of the groups￿ ￿ght-
ing costs is high. Dominance and social waste are inversely related.
Proof. The proof follows directly from (10) and (13)
Fractionalized societies with groups of equal strength have particularly wasteful power
struggles and a high turnover of winners. The average frequency of each group k being the
incumbent is of course equal to ρk. Thus on average the groups with the lowest ￿ghting
costs are most likely to be the winner. If the cost of ￿ghting for one particular group
approaches zero, while the costs of the others remain ￿xed, the group that can ￿ght for
free will be the incumbent forever and none of the potential challengers are willing to take
up the ￿ght.
One example is illustrated in Figure 1, where there are two groups, with α1 ≤ α2. In
the two group case γ =( 1− α1/α2)/(1 + α1/α2) < 1. When the two groups are equal
the waste is 1/2 and stability is 1/2( α1/α2 =1a n dγ2 = 0). When the cost for the7
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￿
superior group declines the political stability increases while the waste decreases. In the
limit where the superior group has zero cost (α1/α2 =0a n dγ2 = 1) stability is absolute
and waste is zero.
In oligopolistic markets the variable ω re￿ects the degree of market power. By using
















Here, c is the market-wide average cost and ￿/ω is, therefore, the average pro￿tm a r g i n .
Figure 1 thus illustrates that this pro￿t margin rises sharply and approaches in￿nity as one
￿rm captures the market dominance due to declining costs. To rephrase Proposition 2 to
the context of the marketplace: The index of dominance ￿ is high when the heterogeneity
of ￿rms￿ unit costs is high. The average pro￿tm a r g i n(￿/(1 − ￿)) rises when the index
of dominance goes up. Note, however, that the price itself depends only on the average
cost ﬂ α and the number of ￿rms, according to (6).
3.1 Entry and Exit
So far the number of ￿ghting groups in the battle￿eld has been exogenously ￿xed. Entry
and exit are of course equally important in battle￿elds as it is in the marketplace. Propo-
sition 1 states that social waste goes down as the heterogeneity of the groups￿ strengths
increases for a ￿xed number of groups. However, the premise that the number of groups
is ￿xed, while the heterogeneity increases (or that the number of groups increases while
the heterogeneity is constant) is unrealistic. In order to have a more meaningful analysis,
one has to incorporate a participation constraint. For example, as the heterogeneity of
c o s t sg o e su p ,t h el e a s te ﬃcient groups will choose to withdraw from the ￿ght altogether.
The analytical solution of the model with exogenous participation implies that such a
marginal group contributes with negative ￿ghting eﬀort, which of course is nonsense.
The condition for participation of group k is that the marginal ￿ghting eﬀort has a
positive eﬀect on expected returns. Let Pk be the value of P = R/Q e v a l u a t e di nt h e
Nash equilibrium where all groups but k participate. Then the condition for group k to8
want to participate in the ￿ghting is that its gain from participation is larger than the
associated opportunity cost,
Pk > αk. (15)
If this condition is not ful￿lled, the group becomes a non-participant by setting its ￿ghting
eﬀort yk equal to zero. In the language of market competition, a positive price-cost margin
is required to enter the market. Hence, as long as there is some degree of heterogeneity
in the α￿s, there is a limit for the growth in the number of groups/￿rms. From (6) we see
that as N goes up, the variable P gets arbitrarily close to ﬂ α and for a suﬃciently large
number of groups, condition (15) is not ful￿lled for the group with the highest cost α.5
The relationship between the number of groups and social waste can be strongly
aﬀected when there is endogenous participation. This is demonstrated by the following
example, where we must distinguish between the total number of groups M and the
number of participating groups N. In the example, we vary M and keeps the heterogeneity
of groups γ the same.
￿ Example: Let the total number of potential groups be M.L e t 1 /3o ft h e s eb e
eﬃcient with αk =1a n dl e t2 /3b ei n e ﬃcient with αk =2 . I nt h a tc a s et h e
coeﬃcient of variation for all groups is γ2
M =2 /25. Based on (15), it follows that:










2. If M>6, only the eﬃcient groups participate and N is therefore equal to M/3.








Waste as a function of potential groups M is illustrated in Figure. 2 Note that in the
￿gure waste is a continuous function of M, given by (10).
T h em o s ti m p o r t a n tf e a t u r ei st h ek i n ka tM =6 . As the number of groups grows
the least eﬃcient groups eventually choose to leave the ￿ght - i.e., at M =6 . W h e n
M>6, only the M/3e ﬃcient groups, all equally eﬃcient, participate in the ￿ght. In the
example, the eﬀect of decreasing group heterogeneity dominates the drop in number and
the slope of the waste ratio curve turns positive when M>6.
Figure 2 also illustrates the hump associated with Proposition 1, ii). When M<6, all
groups participate (N = M) and the waste is determined by (10), which has its maximum
for N =
p
27/2 ≈ 3.7. The waste curve increases to the left and decreases to the right
of M =3 .7.6 In the example, the waste in the case of 6 groups is below the waste in the
case of 3 groups, even though γ i st h es a m ei nb o t hc a s e s .
T h ei n t u i t i o ni sa sf o l l o w s :I nt h ec a s eo f6g r o u p st h et w oe ﬃcient ones do all the
￿ghting and the ineﬃcient groups are indiﬀerent between participating or not (condition
5Note that if some of the participating groups had their ￿ghting limited by a resource constraint, Pk
would increase and a larger number of less eﬃcient groups could choose to participate in the ￿ghting. In
the case where groups are resource constrained, a larger variety of groups could therefore be taking part
in the ￿ghting.
6Note that for M ≤ 6 Figure 2 illustrates all cases where N = M and γ2 =2 /25.9
Figure 2: The relationship between waste and numbers, an example













(15) holds with equality). When the number of groups is 3, only one of them is eﬃcient.
This invites ￿ghting by the less eﬃcient groups so that waste goes up. The net returns
accruing to eﬃcient groups go down because the waste ratio goes up at the same time as
the least eﬃcient groups obtain a positive share of the rents. The intuition is similar to
that behind the possibility that a merger in an oligopolistic market may lead to a loss for
the merging ￿rms (see Salant, Switzer and Reynolds 1983 who call the result ￿bizarre￿).
In both the battle￿eld and the marketplace the result hinges on the assumption that
the contenders cannot commit to a certain level of supply. If commitment were possible,
Stackelberg-like situations may arise. We now turn to the possibility of a peaceful outcome
were all groups implicitly or explicitly agree not to ￿ght.
3.2 Collusion or Warfare
One of the early contributions in the literature on collusion in markets (Bishop 1960) is
titled ￿Duopoly: Collusion or Warfare,￿ which could not have been more appropriate in
the present context. As we show above, ￿ghts over resource rents imply waste. Just like
suppliers in a market sometimes collude to extract the monopoly rents, ￿ghting groups
c o u l dg a i nm u c hi ft h e ya g r e e dn o tt o￿ght and share the rent.7 Collectively, the groups
then avoid the waste of resources, realizing a peace dividend of ωR.
Consider the case where the groups split the rent R such that each group gets a share
of the rent σkR as long as they do not ￿ght. If in the case of deviation there is an instant









σk ≤ 1. (16)
7In the language of realpolitik this could be labeled a non-aggression pact. See Sandler and Hartley
(2001) for an overview of the economics of alliances and Skaperdas (1992) for an alternative view on
cooperation.10
Condition (16) is similar to the condition for collusion in oligopolistic markets backed
by trigger strategies (Friedman 1971).8 The main diﬀerence is that we assume instant
Nash-reversion.
In markets, collusions are fragile arrangements. In the literature, eﬀective collusion
is less likely when monitoring is diﬃcult or when the authorities are actively penalizing
collusion. These problems are not as relevant in the case of a treaty bringing peace instead
of violent con￿ict. All parties have an interest in transparency and the collusion need not
be a clandestine arrangement.
That all groups have a gain is obviously feasible for many combinations of the σ￿s. One
possibility is that the shares σk are determined by the relative strengths of the groups.
e.g., distributing according to the expected shares of the rents (σk = ρk), or according to
expected net gains (σk = ρ2
k/(1 − ω)). In these cases, collusion would be an attractive
possibility for all ￿ghting groups. The rules are robust to small stochastic shocks to the
parameters as all groups have a strictly positive gain compared to ￿ghting.
Several peaceful sharing arrangements of the rents are always possible. An equal
sharing based on relative group size, however, may not always satisfy the conditions for
peace. The risk that such equal sharing breaks the condition for sustained peace is high
when either a large part of the population is not part of any potentially ￿ghting groups
or there are some groups that are small in number but eﬃcient in ￿ghting.
Alternatively, σk can be determined by economic strength, such that groups with high
private earnings (high αk) obtain a high share of the rents as well. In this case, groups with
low αk may ￿nd it worthwhile to ￿ght as their gain from peace easily becomes negative
(σk − ρ2
k < 0).
The outbreak of violent con￿icts may be aﬀected by additional factors. Group k￿s
narrowly calculated expected net gain from peace relative to con￿ict is (σk − ρ2
k)R ≥ 0.
This inequality may be reversed by incorporating additional factors such as mistaken
perceptions, hatred, or vengeance. Since it only takes one group to start a violent con￿ict,
the peace is more secure the larger is the expected net gain for each group. When, however,
the expected net gain for a group is low, the inclusion of other factors may easily change
the inequality and trigger a con￿ict. A policy of pragmatic con￿ict prevention could then




















k k =1...M. (18)
With this rule all groups get an equal expected net gain from sustained peace by adding
equal shares of the peace dividend ωR/M to their con￿ict return ρ2
kR.9 The principle
behind (17) has a Rawlsian ￿avor of distributive justice, but our justi￿cation is somewhat
diﬀerent. One interpretation of Rawls is that inequalities should only be accepted as long
as they contribute to a better outcome for the worst-oﬀ group. Our pragmatic policy
(17) maximizes the probability of peace and therefore minimizes the probability that the
8We use M to indicate the number of groups. In order for an agreement to work, all groups must
bene￿t from it, also the least eﬃcient that would not participate in a full ￿ght. These groups have ρ =0
and need only a small share σ as compensation.
9Note that this sharing arrangement also bene￿ts the non-￿ghting groups who have ρ =0 .11
worst-oﬀ group is left with its con￿ict payoﬀ only. By maximizing the probability of
peace, the pragmatic policy can be interpreted in utilitarian terms since it maximizes the
expected peace dividend.
The peace dividend is high in societies in which ￿ghting would have been particularly
wasteful. Equal societies, with an equal distribution of α￿s, would have the most costly
violent con￿icts once con￿icts start. Therefore, the peace dividend is high and the risk of
con￿ict is low as long as the peace dividend is distributed equally. Thus, by its enforcement
of peace, equity may in itself constitute a valuable social capital in egalitarian societies.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Violent con￿icts kill and destroy and produce other long term bads. ￿Over recent decades,
t h ep r e s e n c eo fc i v i lc o n ￿ict appears to be one of the major causes of underdevelopment:
six of the worst ten performers in the world, judged by HDI and GNP per capita are
countries which currently have, or have recently had, severe civil wars￿ (Stewart and
O￿Sullivan, 1998).
A portion of the economics con￿ict literature explains such ￿ghting as a game between
groups, where each group optimize its use of resources, in appropriation and production
as Pareto said, in order to maximize expected returns. These models are similar to
models of market competitions and, not surprisingly, many of the results are the same,
but with novel interpretations. The Her￿ndahl-Hirschman index, for example, have an
interpretation in the case of con￿ict as the power concentration. Both in battle￿elds and
marketplaces, contests are more intense when the contenders are many and more equally
paired than when the contenders are few and diverse. Also entry and exit aﬀect the
structure of ￿ghting. As we demonstrate, con￿i c tm o d e l st h a td on o ta c c o u n tf o rt h e
obvious participation constraint easily produce nonsensically comparative statics.
The similarities highlighted here, stem from the bold, but questionable assumption
that pro￿t motives are the guiding principle for behavior both in the marketplace and
in the battle￿eld. There is, however, one important diﬀerence between the two models.
Their welfare implications are obviously diametrically diﬀerent. In the market the eﬀort
by each ￿rm is transformed to a private good, while, in the case of con￿ict, the eﬀort by
each group transforms to a public bad brought to the battleground. Fortunately, groups
that agree to reap the peace dividend in an explicit agreement may have less problems
than producers who try to reap the monopoly gains in a tacit collusion. Thus, collusion
may be more easily achieved when it is good for society than when it is bad.
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